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I.

INTRODUCTION

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech1 was a mistake. In that case decided in
2000, the United States Supreme Court purported to find support in its equal
protection precedents for a claim by a "'class of one' where the plaintiff did not
allege membership in a class or group." 2 In upholding the claim of a homeowner
who alleged that the village had imposed an unequal burden on her when
connecting her home to the public water supply,3 the Court ignored a series of
equal protection precedents to the contrary and employed two obscure, long-

* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. B.A., Trinity College; M.A.,
City University of New York; J.D., Harvard University. The author thanks William Dunlap for his
editing and Meredith Williams for her research assistance.
1.

28 U.S. 562 (2000).

2.

Id. at 564 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 527 U.S. 1067, 1067 (1999)).

3.

See id.at 565.
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ignored precedents to support its holding. 4 In addition to this problematic
handling of precedent, Olech also generated a practical concern: the potential to
turn "every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be tens or
even hundreds of thousands every year, into a federal constitutional case." 5 The
immediate response of the lower federal courts to the Olech decision can best be
described as damage control. Federal judges sought to restrict the effect of Olech
by reading into its holding a limitation that was hard to find in the text of the
Supreme Court decision. Consistent with earlier equal protection precedents on
the selective enforcement of criminal and civil laws, the lower federal courts
attempted to limit the scope of the Olech class of one claim by requiring a
showing of bad faith motivation on the part of the defendant.6 Such attempts to
limit the class of one claim in this way led to confusion and uncertainty.7
Eight years after Olech, in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,8
the Supreme Court revisited the class of one claim in a case by a government
employee who alleged wrongful termination. 9 The Engquist Court conceded that
there was a problem with an unrestrained interpretation of the Olech holding
because, under such an extreme view, "any personnel action in which a wronged
employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment will suddenly become
the basis for a federal constitutional claim." 10 The Engquist Court, however,
declined the opportunity to reconsider the conceptual underpinnings of the class
of one claim or to follow the lead of the lower courts by requiring bad faith
motivation.1 1 Instead, the Court decided to limit Olech by creating a specific
exception for government employment 12 and, more generally, by excepting those
forms of government action "which by their nature involve discretionary
decisionmaking
based on a vast array of subjective, individualized
1
assessments."

4.
See id.at 564-65 (citing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S.
336 (1989); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923)); discussion infra Parts
II, IJJ.A.
5.
Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998), af'd, 528 U.S. 562

(2000).
6.
See, e.g., Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a
class of one claim because no "animus was presented in [the] case"); see also infra notes 113-120
and accompanying text (describing the bad faith showing required by federal courts).
7.
See Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring)
("May the Court enlighten us; the fact that the post-Olech cases are all over the map suggests a need
for the Court to step in and clarify its 'cryptic' per curiam decision." (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The EqualProtection Clause and "Classes of One," 89
KY. L.J. 69, 133 (2000-2001))).
8.
128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
9. Id.at 2149.
10. Id. at 2156.
11. See id. at 2153-57 (discussing the principles underlying class of one claims while failing
to adopt a requirement of bad faith).
12. Id. at 2151-52.
13. Id.at 2154.
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Perhaps the Supreme Court viewed the Engquist holding as a reasonable
compromise that preserved the basic class of one claim but eliminated its most
egregious application-the factual setting of public employment. In fact,
however, because the Engquist Court was unwilling either to address the flawed
concept underlying the class of one theory or to consider the adoption of a bad
faith limitation, its purported solution to the class of one problem-the creation
of a "discretionary decisionmaking" exception -simply confused things
further. The Court's Engquist opinion went too far and not far enough. By
excepting all discretionary government action from the class of one claim,
Engquist seems to eliminate any cause of action for a plaintiff harmed by the
vindictive act of a government official when that act is part of an exercise of
discretion. 15 By failing to impose a bad faith requirement on the class of one
claim, Engquist seems to endorse a federal equal Protection claim every time a
rule is not enforced in an absolutely uniform way.
This Article will examine the Olech and Engquist cases in light of earlier
precedents. Some of these precedents treat the Equal Protection Clause as a limit
on governmental classification. Other precedents involve selective prosecution
and require proof of bad motive. Part II of this article, by way of background,
will examine how the class of one claim fits into traditional arguments about
equality, classifications, rules, and the exercise of discretion. Part III will
examine the Olech and Engquist opinions. Part IV will examine how the lower17
federal courts have responded to the Engquist "discretionary decisionmaking"
exception.
II. THE

CLASS

OF

ONE

CLAIM

IN

CONTEXT:

EQUALITY

ARGUMENTS,

CLASSIFICATIONS, RULES, AND DISCRETION

The term "class of one" is not self-defining, and the Supreme Court has not
fully explained it. At the most obvious level, the term refers to an equal
protection claim by a single person, the so-called "class of one." 18 This obvious
explanation is not very helpful, however, since the class of one claim arises in
several different settings and its meaning changes with the context. 19 To
understand the novelty of the Court's class of one reasoning in Olech and
Engquist, it is helpful to review the traditional template of equal protection
arguments and to examine how well or how badly the class of one claim fits each
setting.

14. See id. at 2154.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 182-187.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 113-145.
17. Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2154.
18. See Vill. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
19. Compare Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2155 (declining to apply class of one jurisprudence to
public employment), with United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 2008) (considering
class of one claims in the context of prosecutorial discretion).
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The command of equality is essentially comparative.
It requires a
comparison of one entity with another entity. Thus, it makes sense to claim that
"A equals B," but it is nonsense to assert that "A equals." Since Aristotle, the
rule of equality has been understood to involve the comparative command that
those similarly situated should be treated similarly.21 Though equality arguments
require at least two entities to compare, they do not require any more than two
entities. Thus, it is not necessary to compare groups of people in order to make
equality arguments. A standard example of a comparative equality argument that
involves two, and only two, persons is the situation of a parent with two
children. Suppose that the children are identical twins-eight-year-old boysand that the parent requires one of the twins to go to bed at 8:00 p.m. while
allowing the other to stay up until 11:00 p.m. The first twin likely would argue,
on equality grounds, that since he was exactly the same as his twin in all relevant
ways, that he should have the same bedtime. Absent some special circumstances,
such as a medical problem that required extra sleep, the equality argument would
be a powerful one.
The equality argument in the preceding paragraph involves the comparison
of two persons, and it demonstrates that it is possible to make equality arguments
that are limited to two persons without making any generalizations about classes
of people. That possibility being conceded, the more common kind of equality
argument, particularly in the legal sphere, is the one that compares two classes of
persons. 22 To classify is to identify a trait that makes a person a member of a
class (all those over fifty, for example) and then to ascribe a certain treatment
(such as forced retirement) for those who, having the trait, are members of the
class.2 3 The typical equality challenge to this kind of classification compares one
class of persons-those who have the trait-with a second class of personsthose without the trait-and argues that, because the two classes are similarly
situated, the members of both classes should be treated similarly.
Whether one is comparing individuals or classes, the problem arises in
24
determining who is similar to whom and therefore entitled to similar treatment.
This question of similarity is unanswerable in the abstract. On the one hand, all
human beings are similar to all other human beings in having, for example, a

20. See, e.g., Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Adjudging
equality necessarily requires comparison...."); Buckles v. Columbus Mun. Airport Auth., No. CS00-986, 2002 WL 193853, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2002) ("An equal protection claim simply
cannot exist absent an allegation that, compared to others, the plaintiff was treated less favorably."
(emphasis omitted)).
21. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 542-43 (1982) (citing
ARISTOTLE, ETHICANICOMACHEAbk. V §§ 1131a-1131b (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford 1925) (n.d.)).
22. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (analyzing an equal protection claim
in terms of classifications).
23. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 344-45 (1949) (providing the classic treatment of the process of classification and its place in
making equal protection arguments).
24. See id. at 345.
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common human genome as opposed to an ape or rat genome. They are therefore
entitled to similar treatment. On the other hand, each human being is unique-an
entity with his or her own genes and life experience-and thus different from
everyone else and entitled to different treatment. The difficulty in solving this
conundrum of determining who is similar to whom is substantial. 25 Peter Westen
has called
it an impossible task--one that makes the idea of equality an empty
26
thing.
The problem is addressed by conceding that one cannot determine who is
similar to whom in the abstract without reference to an external criterion-the
purpose for which the classification was made. Thus, for example, all people
over the age of fifty share a trait that make them members of a class. Are they
similarly situated to individuals in a class made up of people younger than fifty?
If the purpose of the classification is to identify individuals who still have
sufficient vigor to perform a physically demanding job like police work, then the
two classes might be considered differently situated. 27 However, if the purpose
of the classification is to determine who is eligible to vote, then the two classes
appear to be similarly situated because physical vigor bears little relation to the
ability to vote. The Supreme Court has developed standards of review to
determine the degree of scrutiny that a court will apply when deciding whether a
classification satisfies the demands of the Equal Protection Clause. The most
basic is the rational basis standard, which requires that a classification be
rationally related to a permissible governmental interest. 28 Where suspect
classifications or fundamental rights are involved, the Court insists on a higher
standard of review-either intermediate scrutiny29 or strict scrutiny 30 -that
requires a closer fit between classification and purpose.
Classifications are created by rules. The rules themselves come into
existence through formal adoption in statutes or regulations or de facto from
court decisions or consistent patterns of conduct over time. The proper
application of the Equal Protection Clause to rules is sometimes confusing,
particularly in the context of class of one claims. To identify the extremely

25. See Westen, supra note 21, at 544 ("The trouble is that no two people are alike in every

respect.").
26.

Id.

27. The example here of the classification that requires police officers to retire at age fifty is
based on the facts of MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 308-12 (1976).
28. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) ("The appropriate standard of review
is whether the difference in treatment... rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.").
29. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[C]lassifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.").
30. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("[Racial] classifications are

constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests."); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and

that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake." (internal citations omitted)).
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limited context in which class of one claims may appropriately be made, it is
important to distinguish three different contexts in which the Equal Protection
Clause is applied to rules: (1) the situation where a rule that has been properly
applied according to its terms is challenged as being unreasonable; 31 (2) the
situation where a rule is conceded to be reasonable but has not been properly
applied in an individual case; 32 and (3) the situation where a rule, conceded to be
reasonable and properly applied, has been selectively enforced.33 In addition to
these contexts, the Equal Protection Clause may also be applied in a fourth
context: the situation involving a purely discretionary action by a government
agent where no rule applies at all.34
In the first and most common context of applying the Equal Protection
Clause to a rule, a plaintiff who has been harmed by the proper application of a
rule claims that the rule itself is unreasonable and therefore violates equal
protection. Consider, for example, a rule that requires all police officers to retire
at age fifty in order to promote public safety by assuring the physical fitness of
the police force. 35 If the rule is properly applied to a particular police officer who
has reached the age of fifty and forces the officer to retire, the officer might
argue that the rule itself is unreasonable because the correlation between being
age fifty and being unfit is too weak. 36 Such a claim would not go very far in the
courts because the Equal Protection Clause 37
generally requires very little
correlation between classification and purpose. It would not matter that the
particular police officer affected was, in fact, very fit. Once a rule has satisfied
the requirement of reasonableness in general, it does not matter that the
generalization embodied in the rule is not true in a particular case.38 Thus, in this
context, where a plaintiff challenges the reasonableness of a rule that has been

31. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 308 (involving a challenge to mandatory retirement age for
police officers).
32. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) ("The unlawful administration by
state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in
it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.").
33. See, e.g., Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) (involving an
alleged arbitrary enforcement of local ordinances).
34. See, e.g., Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2000) (involving
the police's discretion in "enforcing minor public nuisance laws").
35. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 310-11.
36. See id. at 309-12.
37. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("Whether embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts
to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy,
a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infiinges fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.").
38. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) ("Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that
are relevant to the State's legitimate interests. The Constitution does not preclude reliance on such
generalizations. That age proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any individual case is irrelevant.").
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properly applied to him, the class of one claim, properly understood, will rarely
succeed. In those rare cases where a plaintiff has succeeded in challenging the
overall reasonableness of a rule, it has frequently been the case that the Court has
found an improper motive at work. 39 The rational basis standard requires that a
classification be rationally related to a permissible governmental purpose, but "a
bare... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a
40
legitimate governmental interest."
In the second context, a plaintiff does not complain that a given rule is
unreasonable in general but complains because the rule has not been properly
applied in his case. For example, if a state rule requires police officers to retire at
age fifty but the State forces a particular officer to retire at age forty-nine, the
State has not followed its own rule. Is this a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause? It ought not to be. The failure by the State to apply a rule properly ought
to be considered a violation of the rule, not a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. As Peter Westen has explained, it is a mistake to think that "equality
imposes some substantive requirement of consistency apart from the substance
of the rule itself. '4 1 Of course, rules should be applied consistently, impartially,
and equally. However, "it is wrong to think that, once a rule is applied in accord
with its own terms, equality has something additional to say about the scope of
the rule-something
that is not already inherent in the substantive terms of the
42
rule itself.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Snowden v. Hughes.43 In that
case, a candidate for public office had finished second in the Republican primary
election and was thus entitled under state law to be made a candidate for the
general election." In violation of state law, local election officials failed to
certify him for the general election.45 The candidate brought suit46and claimed
that this failure was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
rejected this claim, noting that there was "no contention that the statutes [were]
in any respect inconsistent with the guarantees of the Fourteen Amendment."47 It
also observed the following:

39. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (finding that the
purpose of a statutory classification was out of animus toward hippies and that purpose was not
legitimate).
40. Id. (emphasis omitted).
41. Westen, supra note 21, at 551.
42. Id. (citing Derek Browne, NonegalitarianJustice, 56 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 48, 58-59
(1978)).
43. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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[N]ot every denial of a right conferred by state law involves a denial of
the equal protection of the laws, even though the denial of the right to
one person may operate to confer it on another....
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its
face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be
treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown48to
be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
Thus, in the ordinary case and absent improper motivation, the
misapplication of a rule by state officials does not constitute a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.49 Therefore, this factual setting is also not an
appropriate context for a class of one claim.
In the third context, a plaintiff complains not that a given rule is
unreasonable or that it has been misapplied in her case; rather, the plaintiff
complains that the rule has been applied by state officials correctly only in her
case. 50 This is the problem of underenforcement. For example, if a state rule
requires police officers to retire at age fifty and the State requires a particular
police officer to retire at age fifty but allows others to continue to work after that
age, is that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause? In most cases, the
underenforcement of state laws does not constitute a violation of equal
protection. As Judge Posner has explained, "[t]he Constitution does not require
states to enforce their laws (or cities their ordinances) with Prussian
thoroughness as the price of being allowed to enforce them at all. Otherwise few
speeders would have to pay traffic tickets. Selective, incomplete enforcement of
the law is the norm in this country., 51 This means that random underenforcement
of the law by government authorities does not violate equal protection and is
therefore not a proper context for a class of one claim.52
On the other hand, there is another line of authority that holds that the
selective enforcement of the law can, in certain circumstances, violate the Equal
Protection Clause.53 The Supreme Court has held that while a prosecutor has
broad discretion to enforce criminal laws, prosecutorial discretion may not be
"based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification." 54 More generally with regard to enforcement of noncriminal
rules, such as zoning ordinances, it is not practically possible to hold a local

48. Id. at 8.
49. See id. at 11-12.
50. See, e.g., Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that
the procedure employed to effect a fireman's discharge did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. Id. (internal citations omitted).
52. See infra notes 113-120 and accompanying text (examining courts' treatment of

underenforcement).
53. See infra notes 121-145 and accompanying text (discussing courts' treatment of selective
enforcement).
54. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
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government to a standard of strict Prussian uniformity.55 Plaintiffs can prevail in
such cases, however, if they can prove "both (1) that they were treated
differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that such differential
treatment was based on "'impermissible considerations such as race, religion,
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or
bad faith intent to injure a person."', 56 It is in this single context of applying
rules-selective enforcement based on bad faith-that the class of one claim
both makes sense and has significant precedential support.
There is a fourth context in which the Equal Protection Clause is applied,
involving not the direct application or enforcement of rules, but the exercise of
discretion by government officials in making decisions not mandated by any
rule. These discretionary judgments by government officials include decisions
regarding government employment,
which contractor to select for a
58
government contract, whether to waive a zoning ordinance,59 whether to
approve a building subdivision, 60 and whether a student should be dismissed or
expelled from an educational institution. 61 In these discretionary settings, it can
be very difficult to make a compelling equality argument because, absent an
objective standard against which each person can be measured, it is difficult to
determine who is similarly situated to whom. 62 As with the enforcement of rules,
the exercise of pure governmental discretion is not likely to lead to an equal
protection violation absent evidence of improper motive. 63 This context seems as
though it might be appropriate for
64 a class of one equal protection claim, but the
Engquist decision rules that out.
Thus, the Equal Protection Clause has a complicated connection to rules and
discretion. The preceding material can be summarized as follows: A plaintiff
who has been harmed by the proper application of a rule may argue that the
Equal Protection Clause has been violated because the rule is itself unreasonable.
These arguments rarely succeed without evidence of improper motive. A

55. See Hameetman, 776 F.2d at 641.
56. Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
57.
58.

See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2155 (2008).
See Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2008).

59. See HarlenAssocs., 273 F.3d at 499-503.
60.

See MKA Realty Corp. v Town of Wallkill, 82 F. App'x 712, 713-14 (2d Cir. 2003).

61.

See Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 1:07-CV-1290-SEB-WTL, 2008 WL

4274451, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 10, 2008).
62. See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the

similarly situated requirement will be difficult to establish when the government makes
discretionary decisions based on multiple factors).
63. See Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2000).
64. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008) (explaining that in
cases of "discretionary decisionmaking,... allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out
of a particular person would undermine the very discretion that... state officials are entrusted to

exercise").
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plaintiff harmed by the improper application of a rule may argue that the rule has
been violated but, absent an improper motivation by state officials, the plaintiff
will not be able to prove an equal protection violation. A plaintiff harmed by the
proper, but underenforced, application of a rule ordinarily has no equal
protection claim, unless the underenforcement was actually selective
enforcement due to a bad faith intent to injure. A plaintiff harmed by the exercise
of discretion by a government official will have a difficult time prevailing on an
equal protection claim absent evidence of improper motivation. It is significant
that, in all of these contexts, there is a strong correlation between evidence of
improper motivation and the likelihood of success in making an equal protection
claim.
III. THE SUPREME COURT ENDORSES THE CLASS OF ONE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIM

This part examines the Supreme Court's two class of one equal protection
cases: Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech65 and Engquist v. Oregon Department of
66
Agriculture.
A.

67
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech

Grace Olech brought a case in federal district court alleging that the Village
of Willowbrook had violated the Equal Protection Clause by demanding a thirtythree-foot easement to connect her house to the public water supply while
requiring only a fifteen-foot easement from other village residents. According
to the complaint, the Village demanded a larger easement from her because she
had successfully sued the Village in an unrelated matter.69 The district court

65. 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
66. 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008).
67. The author previously commented extensively on this case in Robert C. Farrell, Classes,
Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REv. 367 (2003).
Others have also commented on this case. See generally William D. Araiza, Irrationalityand
Animus in Class-of-One EqualProtection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493 (2007) (analyzing whether
class of one claims can be based on irrational government action); Hortensia S. Carreira, Protecting
the "Class ofOne," 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 331 (2001) (discussing the history and impact of
class of one equal protection claims); J. Michael McGuinness, The Impact of Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech on Disparate Treatment Claims, 17 TouRo L. REv. 595 (2001) (discussing
the impact of class of one claims); J. Michael McGuinness, The Rising Tide of Equal Protection:
Willowbrook and the New Non-Arbitrariness Standard, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 263
(2001) (examining contemporary equal protection law); Paul D. Wilson, What Hath Olech
Wrought? The Equal Protection Clause in Recent Land-Use Damages Litigation, 33 URB. LAW.
729 (2001) (surveying the reaction of lower courts to Olech in land-use damages litigation);
Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal ProtectionClause and "Classes of One, " 89 Ky. L.J.
69 (2000-2001) (examining class of one jurisprudence); Erwin Chemerinsky, Suing the Government
for ArbitraryActions, TRIAL, May 2000, at 89 (examining Village of Willowbrook v. Olech).
68. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563.
69. Id.
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dismissed Olech's complaint for failure to state a claim. This was not
surprising because Olech had not alleged any discrimination against a suspect or
quasi-suspect class or any infringement of a fundamental right; in fact, the
complaint had not alleged that Olech was a member of a class at all.71 Olech
appealed the district court decision to the Seventh Circuit, which reversed after
determining that Olech had stated a cause of action.72 Judge Posner, writing for
the court, explained that the equal protection standard established by Seventh
Circuit precedent is met where a plaintiff proves "'a spiteful effort to73"get" [a
person] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective. ,,
Given the insignificance of the claim at issue and the absence of any
substantial precedent in the area, Olech seemed an unlikely candidate for
Supreme Court review. The Court, however, granted certiorari and affirmed the
decision of the Seventh Circuit, although on different grounds.74 The per curiam
opinion is very brief, consisting of only five paragraphs.75 The Court identified
the issue to be decided as "whether the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a
cause of action on behalf of a 'class of one' where the plaintiff did not allege
membership in a class or group. 76 The Court, answering in the affirmative,
explained its decision as follows:
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought
by a "class of one," where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. In so doing, we
have explained that "'[t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a77statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents. ,,
The Court determined that Olech's complaint satisfied this standard because
it could "fairly be construed as alleging that the Village intentionally demanded a
33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her property to the municipal
water supply where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other
similarly situated property owners," and that the complaint alleged the treatment

70.

Id.

71.

See id. at 564.

72.

Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 528 U.S. 562

(2000).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
260 U.S.

Id.at 387 (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Olech, 528 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 563-65.
Id. at 564 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 527 U.S. 1067, 1067 (1999)).
Id. at 564 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
441, 445 (1923)).
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was "'irrational and wholly arbitrary."'' 78 The Court concluded that the
allegations, "quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, [were]
sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis,"
even though the court did not reach "the alternative theory of 'subjective ill will'
relied on by [the Seventh Circuit]. 7 9
The Court's opinion in Olech is notable both for the precedents cited as well
as for those ignored. Although the Olech opinion did not make clear whether the
Village's actions had been discretionary or had involved the application of a
rule, the Court subsequently described the Olech case as involving "a clear
standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily
assessed."8 The Court appears to have been of the view that the Village violated
its own de facto rule that only a fifteen-foot easement should have been
required. 81 In concluding that the Village's violation of its own rule also
constituted a violation of equal protection, the court ignored its holding in
Snowden v. Hughes, which provided that, absent improper motivation, the
failure by state officials to follow a state law is only a violation of that law and
83
not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although the Court insisted that
cases had previously recognized successful class of one equal protection claims,
the Court strained to cite even two cases to support the decision. 84 The first,
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,85 was an obscure case from 1923.86 The
second, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission,87 though a more
recent case, was one that the Court had previously attempted to limit to its
facts. 88 Prior to Olech, the two cases were "'as far removed
89 from the pantheon of
influential equal protection cases as one could imagine.'
In Sioux City Bridge, the Court considered the equal protection claim of a
company whose property was assessed for tax purposes at one hundred percent
valuation in accordance with state law, while other properties in the county were
assessed at a mere fifty-five percent valuation.90 When the company appealed the
order of the county board of equalization to the state trial court, the state court

78. Id. at 565.
79. Id.
80. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008).
81. See id. at 2153-54 (noting that the board "consistently required" a fifteen-foot easement).
82. 321 U.S. 1 (1944); see also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing
holding in Snowden).
83. Id. at 8.
84. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
85. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
86. In the fifty years before Olech, the Supreme Court cited Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County in the text of a majority opinion only once. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989).
87. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
88. See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
89. Griffm Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farrell, supra
note 67, at 394).
90. Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 445.
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determined that the county had properly valued the bridge and dismissed the case
without considering whether other property in the county had been
systematically undervalued. 9 1 The state supreme court affirmed the lower court's
ruling because the assessment was not "so manifestly wrong" that it required
reversal.92 These facts constitute a classic case of underenforcement of the law.
The county had applied the law correctly, but it had consistently failed to enforce
it against entities owning similar properties. 93 Absent evidence of improper
motivation, such cases typically fail. 94 In Sioux City Bridge, however, the
Supreme Court determined that "the right of [a] taxpayer whose property alone is
taxed at 100 per cent[] of its true value is to have his assessment reduced to the
percentage of that value at which others are taxed even though this is a departure
from the requirement of statute." 95
Sioux City Bridge appears to indicate that mere underenforcement of a law
violates the Equal Protection Clause. However, the Court also noted that the case
had been dismissed without any factual findings of intentional discrimination
and remanded the case for a hearing on that issue, "inviting [the lower court's]
attention to the well-established rule... that mere errors of judgment do not
support a claim of discrimination, but that there must be something moresomething which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential
principle of practical uniformity., 96 In Snowden, the Court explained what this
"something more" would be:
[W]here the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory
duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair
on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled
to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is
shown to be present
in it an element of intentional or purposeful
97
discrimination.
Consequently, Sioux City Bridge is not an appropriate precedent on which to
predicate the Olech class of one claim. Sioux City Bridge is distinguishable
because it involved a proper but selective enforcement of a standard rather than

91. Id. at 443.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 446.
94. See Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Selective,
incomplete enforcement of the law is the norm in this country.").
95. Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 446.
96. Id. at 447 (citing Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Twp. of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353 (1918)).
97. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).
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an improper application of a standard. 98 Thus, if the Village in Olech had a de
facto rule requiring fifteen-foot easements but demanded a thirty-three foot
easement, the Village would violate the easement rule, not the Equal Protection
Clause. On the other hand, the problem in Sioux City Bridge was not that the
plaintiff was adversely affected by the failure of the county to follow the full
value assessment rule but by the fact that the county enforced the rule only in its
case. 99 In addition, the Olech Court completely ignored the limitation imposed
on the plaintiffs equal protection claim by the Sioux City Bridge and Snowden
Courtsl°°-the requirement10 1that the differing treatment amount to intentional or
purposeful discrimination.
The Olech Court also cited Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission. In that case, a coal company alleged that the county assessor
followed a practice of valuing property on the basis of its most recent purchase
price, even though the state constitution required that "'taxation... be equal and
uniform throughout the State"' and that all property "'be taxed in proportion to
its value."'' 10 2 Over time, this method created great disparities in assessments
between longtime owners, whose assessments were low, and recent purchasers,
whose assessments were very high. 103 In fact, the petitioner was paying property
1°4
taxes at a rate thirty-five times that applied to owners of similar properties.
Accordinfly, the Court determined that the scheme violated the Equal Protection
Clause.1 ° Allegheny Pittsburgh and Sioux City Bridge are similarly
distinguishable from Olech-the alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause
was the proper application of a state statute in the face of systematic
underenforcement against other property owners rather than a failure to apply a
particular rule to the complaining party.
Even if Allegheny Pittsburghdoes provide some support for the class of one
claim, the Supreme Court later effectively limited the holding of Allegheny
Pittsburgh to its facts. In Nordlinger v. Hahn,10 6 the Court considered the
validity of Proposition XIII, an amendment to the California Constitution that,
by adopting an acquisition value assessment scheme during a time of substantial
inflation in the housing market, created substantial disparities between the tax
assessments of long-time homeowners and more recent purchasers. 10 7 The Court
determined that the disparate treatment created a classification that rationally

Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 446.
Id. at 446-47.
See Vill. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
See Snowden, 321 U.S. at 8; Sioux City Bridge, 260 U.S. at 446-47.
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989) (quoting
W. VA. CONST. art. X, §1).
103. Id.
104. Id.at 341.
105. Id.at 338.
106. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
107. Id.at 6.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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furthered legitimate state interests.10 8 The petitioners predictably argued that
invalidation of the California tax scheme would require the invalidation of
Allegheny Pittsburgh because both cases involved acquisition value assessment
schemes that produced disparities in property tax assessments.10 9 The Nordlinger
Court rejected the argument after finding "an obvious and critical factual
difference" between the cases because "Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case
where the facts precluded any plausible inference that the reason for the unequal
assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax
scheme." 110 Given the similarity in the acquisition-value assessment schemes,
the factual difference emphasized by the Court is anything but "obvious and
critical." In fact, very little of Allegheny Pittsburgh appears to have survived
Nordlinger,making Allegheny Pittsburgha very slender thread on which to hang
the class of one doctrine.
In addition to its problematic treatment of precedent, the Olech opinion also
raises practical concerns because the decision contains a possible engine for the
destruction of governmental decisionmaking. As Justice Breyer warned, the
majority's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause could "transform man
ordinary violations of city or state law into violations of the Constitution."
Judge Posner had already expressed his own concerns regarding "the prospect of
turning every squabble over municipal services, of which there must be tens or
even hundreds of thousands every year, into a federal constitutional case." '1 12 In
the aftermath of Olech, the lower federal courts attempted to interpret Olech in a
way that would limit its scope to avoid the problem of which Judge Posner
warned.
In the first post-Olech class of one case decided in the federal courts, Judge
Posner interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Olech as not inconsistent with
the Seventh Circuit's own, which required a plaintiff in a class of one case to
prove that the alleged wrongful treatment was a "vindictive action" that included
"improper motive" or "'illegitimate animus. '' 113 For Judge Posner, the improper
motive element of the class of one claim survived the Supreme Court's Olech
opinion.! 14 On the surface, this reading of Olech is surprising because the
Supreme Court specifically noted that it "did not reach the alternative theory of
'subjective ill will' relied on by [the Seventh Circuit]. 115 Following Judge
Posner's lead, however, other circuit courts have preserved the improper motive

108. Id. at 12 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
109. Id. at 14.
110. Id. at 14-16.
111. Vill. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998).
113. Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Olech, 160
F.3d at 388).
114. Id.
115. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565.
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element. 16 The survival of the "bad motive" element likely is due partially to
Judge Posner's persuasive powers, partially to the practical problems that would
result without such a limitation, and partially to the fact that the "bad motive"
element of the class of one claim is consistent with a substantial body of preOlech equal protection doctrine. In fact, one could argue that the "bad motive"
element of the class of one claim is more consistent with earlier selective
enforcement precedents than Olech.
Selective enforcement equal protection arguments arise in an imperfect
world where it is neither constitutionally required nor even possible that
government enforce laws uniformly. 117 This means that there are countless
violations of law, criminal and civil, that are neither identified nor punished.
Perhaps the most obvious example is the police traffic officer who cannot
possibly give tickets to all drivers on a busy highway who exceed the speed
limit. 1Does
the inability to ticket all rule breakers prevent the police officer
from ticketing any rule breaker? And what about the same problem in other
factual contexts? Does the IRS have to bring enforcement proceedings against all
taxpayers who have underpaid their taxes before it can bring a proceeding
against any taxpayer? Does a city have to enforce building restrictions against all
owners before it can bring an enforcement proceeding against any owner? The
common sense answer to these questions has to be no. Otherwise the State could
not enforce its rules at all.
The constitutional rules in this context follow common sense expectations:
underenforcement of state laws, without more, does not constitute a violation of
equal protection. 119 As Judge Posner explained, "[t]he Constitution does not
require states to enforce their laws (or cities their ordinances) with Prussian
thoroughness as the price of being allowed to enforce them at all. Otherwise few
speeders would have to pay traffic tickets. Selective, incomplete enforcement of
the law is the norm in this country., 120 To concede that underenforcement of the
law is the norm, however, is not the same as to condone selective enforcement of

116. See, e.g., Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Under the
equal protection theory urged by Bartell, he must prove that he was singled out for persecution due
to some animosity on the part of APS."), overruled on other grounds by Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch.
Dist. No. 60, 540 F.3d 1213, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 564-65) (maintaining malice in discussion of Olech); Shipp v.
McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916-17 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 564-65) ("To state a
claim sufficient for relief, a single plaintiff must allege that an illegitimate animus or ill-will
motivated her intentionally different treatment from others similarly situated and that no rational
basis existed for such treatment."), overruledon other grounds by McClendon v. City of Columbia,
305 F.3d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). See generally Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d
494, 499-500 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing confusion among the circuits regarding the necessity of
showing animus to establish a class of one claim).
117. See Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1985).
118. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008); Hameetman, 776 F.2d
at 641.
119. See Hameetman, 776 F.2d at 641.
120. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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the law because of an impermissible, bad faith motive. There is a difference
between pulling over every tenth speeding car and pulling over every speeding
car whose driver is black, or every speeding car that has a "Pro Choice" bumper
sticker, or every speeding car that is driven by someone who recently sued the
town successfully. This kind of selective, bad faith enforcement of the law can
be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Oyler v. Boles, 12 1 the Supreme Court rejected a selective enforcement
claim brought by prisoners serving life sentences under a habitual criminal
statute.122 The prisoners argued that the application of the statute to them
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it had been applied "to only a
minority of those subject to its provisions.,, 123 The Court noted that "the
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
constitutional violation." 124 A policy of selective enforcement would violate
equal protection, however, if "the selection was deliberately based upon 125
an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.,
In Wayte v. United States, 126 the Court cited this language from Oyler in
rejecting the selective prosecution claim of individuals who had not registered
with the Selective Service System.1 27 The government's policy of passive
enforcement was to "prosecute[] only those who report[ed] themselves as having
violated the law, or who [were] reported by others."128 The Court explained that
prosecutors have "'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute., 129 Although that
broad discretion is not "'unfettered,"' there was no evidence in Wayte that the
discretion had been exercised on the basis of forbidden categories
"such as race,
130
religion, or other arbitrary classification" as identified in Oyler.
The Second Circuit has elaborated on the "other arbitrary classification"
element of the Supreme Court's selective enforcement doctrine. In 1980, in
LeClair v. Saunders,131 the court considered an equal protection selective
132
enforcement claim arising out of the state inspections of dairy farms. A dairy
farmer complained that a regulation regarding unprotected water supplies had

121. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
122. Id. at 449.
123. Id.
124. Id.at 456.
125. Id.
126. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
127. Id. at 608-10 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (quoting Oyler,
368 U.S. at 456)).
128. Id.at 600.
129. Id. at 607 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982)).
130. Id. at 608-10 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979);
Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 364); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1996)
(citing Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456) (describing broad nature of and Oyler's limits upon prosecutorial
discretion).
131. 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1980).
132. Id.at 607-09.
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133
been enforced more stringently against him than against similar dairy farmers.
The court held that the claim could succeed only upon "proof that (1) the person,
compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that
such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race,
religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or
malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person., 134 This statement of the test
appears to put a gloss on the "other arbitrary classification" language by
including an additional prohibited motivation for enforcing the law-"malicious
or bad faith intent to injure a person., 135 When the plaintiff could not prove that
the state inspector had attempted to injure him, either because of a prohibited
classifications or out of bad faith, the selective enforcement claim did 137
not
succeed. 136 The Second Circuit has continued to adhere to the "bad faith" test.
After the Supreme Court decided Olech in 2000, the Second Circuit
struggled to determine how the Olech class of one equal protection claim relates
to the Second Circuit's selective enforcement equal protection claim. 138 On the
one hand, as a matter of logic, the selective enforcement claim should be the
classic formulation of the class of one claim because it involves the State "going
after" a particular person without justification. On the other hand, the Olech
139
Court stated that it was not relying on the "'subjective ill will"' theory,
suggesting that, if selective enforcement cases are class of one cases, the
requirement of bad faith has been eliminated. For the Second Circuit, this proved
too much. Its response was either to treat selective enforcement claims as distinct
from class of one claims or to indicate that whether "subjective ill will" was
required after Olech was still an open question.
Shortly after Olech, in Harlen Associates v. Incorporated Village of
Mineola,140 the Second Circuit considered the equal protection claim of a
developer who had been denied "a special use permit to operate a convenience
store.",14 1 The plaintiff argued that "Olech modified the second part of the
LeClair analysis by removing the requirement that malice or bad faith be shown

133. Id. at 608.
134. Id. at 609-10.
135. Compare Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 ("[S]election [must be] based upon an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."), with LeClair,627 F.2d at 609-10
("[S]elective treatment [must be] based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion,
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to
injure a person.").
136. LeClair,627 F.2d at 607.
137. See, e.g., LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d
Cir. 1994) (citing LeClair,627 F.2d at 609-10) (applying "bad faith" test to zoning regulations).
138. See Giordano v. City of N.Y., 274 F.3d 740, 751 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000)) (declining to resolve the manner in which Olech
affects the malice requirement); Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 500 (2d Cir.
2001) (observing that circuits read Olech differently without adopting a particular reading).
139. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565.
140. 273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001).
141. Id. at 497.
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in order to state a valid 'class of one' equal protection claim." 142 The Second
Circuit cited other circuits that had maintained the bad motive element even after
the Olech decision but determined that it did not need to resolve the issue
because the
plaintiff had proved neither bad faith nor intentionally different
143
treatment.
These selective enforcement equal protection cases certainly appear to be an
appropriate precedent for federal court decisions that have adopted the "bad
motive" requirement to limit the reach of Olech.144 Judge Posner, however, did
strike a cautionary note about the use of improper motivation as a means of
limiting Olech:
[T]he cases on which I am relying may be fighting a doomed rearguard
action. May the Court enlighten us; the fact that the post-Olech cases are
all over the map suggests a need for the Court to step in and clarify its
"cryptic" per curiam decision.

"Motive" tests are not very satisfactory and are therefore sparingly
employed in the law. Motives are difficult to discern and often they are
irrelevant to the social interests in a case .... Yet motive is sometimes
given legal significance, most famously perhaps in the old spite-fence
cases but also in assessing punitive damages and, of course, in criminal
sentencing. I haven't been able to think of a better way of reining in the
class-of-one cases, which have an ominous potential to burst the proper
bounds of equal protection law, than to insist that an improper motive by
a government official have been the sole cause
145 of the inequality of
treatment of which the plaintiff is complaining.
Not all the lower federal courts, however, have followed Judge Posner's
lead. For some, proof of bad faith motivation was an alternative, but not
required, method of proving a class of one claim. 146 As an alternative method to
limit the reach of Olech, the Ninth Circuit excluded from the class of one
doctrine a particular factual setting-government employment. 147 This case led
to the Supreme Court's second class of one case.

142. Id. at 499-500.
143. Id. at 500.
144. See supranote 116.
145. Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711-13 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted).
146. See, e.g., Nevel v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 297 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing
two approaches to proving class of one equal protection claims).
147. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996 (9th Cir. 2007), aft'd, 128 S. Ct.
2146 (2008).
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148
B. Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture

Anup Engquist worked for the Oregon Department of Agriculture and was
laid off after her position was eliminated. 149 Engquist brought a class of one
claim in federal district court and won a jury verdict of $175,000 in
compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. 150 The jury found
that the employees in her department "'intentionally treat[ed] [Engquist]
differently than others similarly situated with respect to the denial of her
promotion, termination of her employment, or denial of bumping rights without
151
any rational basis and solely for arbitrary, vindictive or malicious reasons.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the class of one theory was "inapplicable to decisions made by public employers
with regard to their employees., 152 Because there was a dispute among the
circuits on the issue, 153 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
Ninth Circuit's decision, 154
carving out a government employment exception to the
Olech class of one claim.
The Court began by noting the apparently contradictory views that the Equal
155
Protection Clause "'protect[s] persons, not groups
and that its "core concern
,156,
[is] as a shield against arbitrary classifications.
In what was a clear harbinger
of the outcome of the case, the Engquist opinion strongly endorsed the second of
these views over the first. 157 The Court noted that "[o]ur equal protection
jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications
that 'affect some groups of citizens differently than others.' Plaintiffs in such
cases generally allege158that they have been arbitrarily classified as members of an
'identifiable group."'
At this point, it would have been logical for the Court to conclude that the
class of one claim created in Olech was inconsistent with this longstanding,
class-based understanding of equal protection. The Court, however, was
unwilling to adopt a wholesale rejection of its Olech opinion, and it did not even
consider adopting the "bad motive" limitation, which had been commonly

148. 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
149. Id.at 2149.
150. Id.at 2149-50.
151. Id.
152. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 996.
153. Id.at 1011 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The majority's holding relating to the class-of-one
theory of equal protection creates inter-circuit conflict, is at odds with the precedent of the Supreme
Court and of this circuit, and is not justified by the policy concerns raised by the majority. Every
other circuit to have considered this question has applied the class-of-one theory to employment.").
154. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2157.
155. Id.at 2150 (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995)).

156. Id.at 2151.
157. Id.
158. Id.at 2152 (internal citations omitted).
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employed in the lower federal courts. 159 Instead, the Court
held that the class of
16
one claim does not extend to government employment. 0
The Court based the exception for government employment on two
grounds. 161 The first involves the distinction between government as lawmaker,
where it exercises "'the power to regulate or license,"' and the government as
proprietor, where it "'manage[s] [its] internal operation.' ' 162 In the second area,
which includes government as employer, the government "'has far broader
powers than does the government as sovereign.' 163 The Court noted that while
"government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept
their positions," 164 the government maintains "significantly greater leeway in its
dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power
to bear on citizens at large. 165 Because government employees interact with the
government in this proprietary context, their class of one equal protection claims
are correspondingly limited. 166
This sovereign/proprietor distinction, however, is not the most important
part of the Engquist opinion because an exception derived from it, being limited
to factual contexts where government was acting as proprietor, would have a
relatively small precedential effect. 167 In explaining its balancing of employee
rights and government employer requirements, the Court enunciated a much
broader principle that expanded the exception well beyond government
employment-Olech class of one claims are ill-fitted, and therefore do not apply,
to
government
acts that exception
involve the
exercise of discretion. 168 The Court
explained
the discretionary
as follows:
There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature
involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of
subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases the rule that people
should be "treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions" is not
violated when one person is treated differently from others, because
treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the
discretion granted. In such situations, allowing a challenge based on the

159. See id. at 2148-57.
160. Id. at 2157.
161. Seeid. at 2151.
162. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
163. Id. (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
164. Id. at 2152.
165. Id. at 2151.
166. See id.
167. Such contexts include government employment and government contracting.
168. See id. at 2154-55.
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arbitrary singling out of a particular person would undermine
the very
169
discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.
The Court then offered as an example of this kind of discretionary
government action the case of a traffic officer stationed on a busy highway who
could not possibly ticket everyone driving above the speed limit:
[A]llowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was
given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or
articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in
the challenged action. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a
subjective, individualized decision that it was subjective and
individualized.
This principle applies most clearly in the employment context, for
employment decisions are quite often subjective and individualized,
resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and
quantify....

...To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way
that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise the
broad discretion
that typically characterizes the employer-employee
170
relationship.

The Court then concluded with a reference to the practical difficulties that
would result if "any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure
up a claim of differential
treatment will suddenly become the basis for a federal
171
constitutional claim.,
Because the Engquist Court was unwilling to overrule Olech but reached a
result that appeared inconsistent with it, the Court needed to distinguished Olech
on its facts. The Court did so by claiming that Olech contained "a clear standard
against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed"
and that "[lt]here was no indication in Olech that the zoning board was exercising
discretionary authority based on subjective, individualized determinations-at
'
least not with regard to easement length."172
The Engquist Court cited no source
for its assertion that there was a "clear standard" in Olech other than the
complaint, which "alleged that the board consistently required only a 15-foot

169. Id.at 2154.
170. Id.at 2154-55.
171. Id. at 2156.
172. Id. at 2153.
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easement, but subjected Olech to a 33-foot easement." 173 Thus, in the absence of
a formal rule on the required dimensions of easements when public utilities are
extended, the Court seems to have been suggesting that the Village had a de
facto rule requiring a fifteen-foot easement to extend the water supply, but had
insisted that Olech provide a thirty-three foot easement. 174 This explanation of
how the facts in Engquist differ from those in Olech has the effect of limiting the
scope of the class of one claim to a space that is almost entirely devoid of matter.
The Court seems to divide up the universe of class of one claims into two
types-those that, as in Olech, involve the application of a "clear standard" and
those that, as in Engquist, involve the exercise of discretion. The Engquist Court
had, in fact, excepted exercises of discretion from the class of one claim. 175 That
left only the application of a "clear standard,, 176 which appears to be the
functional equivalent of "application of a clear rule." When one uses the Equal
Protection Clause to challenge a rule, however, there is a very limited scope for a
class of one claim. If a plaintiff challenges the validity of a rule that has been
properly applied to her, the rule need only meet a reasonableness test, even if its
application is unfair to the individual plaintiff.17 7 If a plaintiff challenges a rule
that has been applied improperly to him, absent improper motivation, that is a
violation of the rule, not of the Equal Protection Clause. 178 If a plaintiff
challenges the proper but underenforced application of a rule to himself, that is
not in the ordinary case a violation of equal protection. 179 Only in the situation
where a rule is selectively enforced against a person based on bad faith or
vindictive motivation is there precedent for an equal protection violation. 180 The
Engquist Court, however, ignored the relevance of bad faith and thus lost the
opportunity to place the class of one equal protection claim on the same footing
as the traditional equal protection selective enforcement claim. 181 When one has
gone through all the contexts in which a class of one claim will not work after
Engquist, there does not seem to be anything left.
The Engquist Court's exception for discretionary government actions also
went too far to the extent it appears to except almost all discretionary
government decisions from constitutional scrutiny. 182 As the Court has made
clear in its selective prosecution cases-where the government retains the
broadest measure of discretion-discretion is not 'unfettered"' but rather

173. Id.
174. Id.at 2153-54.
175. See id.
at 2155.
176. Id. at 2153.
177. See supranotes 36-40 and accompanying text.

178. See supranotes 41-51 and accompanying text.
179. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.
180. See supranotes 120-143 and accompanying text.

181. See Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153-57.
182. See id.at 2154.
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remains "'subject to constitutional constraints. ' 183 Specifically, the
discretionary decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately based upon 184
an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."
As construed by the lower federal courts, the prohibition of "arbitrary
classification" as a basis for exercising discretion includes the selective
enforcement of the law based on a "'malicious or bad faith intent to injure a
person."' ' 185 The Engquist Court did concede in a passing comment that
discretion exercised "on the basis of race or sex would state an equal protection
claim, because such discriminatory classifications implicate basic equal
protection concerns." 186 The Court, however, did not go beyond the broadly
impermissible categories of race and sex and thus was unwilling to adopt a "bad
faith" limitation 187
on its class of one holding that extends more generally beyond
those categories.
There is another problem created by the Engquist exception for discretionary
government actions-the exception is sufficiently broad and vague as to threaten
to swallow the class of one rule. In the immediate aftermath of Engquist, a flood
of cases in the lower federal courts applied the government discretion exception
to a host of factual settings. The next part examines these cases.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF ENGQUIST

It became clear immediately that the Engquist exception was not simply
about government employment but about all discretionary decisionmaking by
government. Thus, in the months following Engquist, the lower federal courts
determined that Engquist's exception for discretionary government action 188
in
employment was equally applicable to the criminal justice system,
government regulation, 189 land use regulation, 190 education, 191 and government
contracting. 192 This section examines the extension of Engquist into these areas.

183. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
184. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
185. Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)).
186. Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154.
187. See id.
188. United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2008).
189. Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, No. 07 Civ. 3908(BMC)(RER), 2008 WL
4222042, at *3-5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008).
190. Nasca v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 05-CV-122 (JFB)(ETB), 2008 WL 4426906, at * 11
n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008).
191. Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
192. Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Discretionin the CriminalJustice System

As an example of an appropriate exercise of governmental discretion that is
not subject to class of one review, the Engquist Court mentioned a police officer
who could not give a ticket to every speeding motorist and thus ticketed some
but not others. 193 It was therefore not surprising that lower federal courts
determined that Engquist's discretionary exception was to be given a significant
194
role in criminal justice cases, including cases of prosecutorial discretion,
parole board determinations, 195 and police officers' decisions to cite or arrest
particular individuals. 196
United States v. Moore197 involved a class of one challenge to an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. 198 Appellant Moore had pleaded guilty to federal drug
charges and then alleged a class of one equal protection claim on the ground that
similarly situated defendants charged in state court had received lighter
sentences. 199 The court noted, given that the state and federal defendants were
charged by two different sovereigns in two different court systems, it would be
difficult for Moore to prove that he and the state defendants were similarly
z
situated . 200
More specifically, the court noted that Moore's argument was
"nakedly aimed at the exercise of prosecutorial discretion., 20 1 The court quoted
black letter Supreme Court doctrine: "'[I]n the ordinary case, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge' to
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. 202
The court then determined that because Moore's "no-rational-basis challenge to
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is doomed to failure, his class-of-one
argument is foreclosed for this reason as well. '20 3 The court cited Engquist as
supporting its decision because "class-of-one equal protection theory is a 'poor
fit' where the challenged governmental action is the product of a broadly
discretionary decision-making process.,, 20 4 The court explained that "the
discretion conferred on prosecutors in choosing whom and how to prosecute is
flatly inconsistent with a presumption of uniform treatment," and thus a class of

193. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154 (2008).
194. United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2008).
195. Adams v. Meloy, 287 F. App'x 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2008); Siao-Pao v. Connolly, 564 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 243-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
196. Robertson v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 1:06-cv-451, 2008 WL 4822218, at *9-11 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 4, 2008).
197. 543 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2008).
198. Id. at 893.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 897.
201. Id. at 899.
202. Id. (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)).
203. Id. at 900.
204. Id. (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2155 (2008)).
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one equal protection challenge is "just as much a 'poor20fit'
5 in the prosecutorial
discretion context as in the public employment context.,
Three other post-Engquist cases involve discretionary actions by parole
boards or police officers. In Adams v. Meloy,206 a prisoner challenged the
decision of the parole board to deny him parole. 207 He claimed that he had been
singled out because he had killed a police officer. 208 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected his class of one claim, citing
Engquist.209 The court noted that "[t]he parole board's inherent discretion
necessitates
that some prisoners will receive more favorable treatment than
2 10
others."

In Siao-Pao v. Connolly, another prisoner challenged a denial of his
parole as a class of one violation, comparing himself to a woman who received a
similar sentence for the same conviction but was granted parole. 212 The court
rejected his claim, citing Engquist.213 The court explained:
[T]he Parole Board is required to weigh criteria specific to a particular
inmate, and need not enumerate or give equal weight to each factor.
This process is discretionary, as was the decision in Engquist, where the
Supreme Court rejected a class of one argument and accorded deference
to the state's determination
based on the subjective and individualized
2 14
nature of the decision.
215

Finally, in Robertson v. City of Grand Rapids,

the court again cited

Engquist as holding that the class of one theory "was not appropriate for areas
involving discretionary determinations. ' '216 Robertson, therefore, held that all of
the plaintiffs class of one claims "relatfing] to discretionary decisions by City
police officers..,
are not viable in the wake of the Supreme Court's Engquist
21 7
decision."

205. Id. at 901.
206. 287 F. App'x 531 (7th Cir. 2008).
207. Id. at 532.
208. Id. at 533.

209. Id. at 534 (citing Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2148-49).
210. Id.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

564 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id.at 243.
Id. at 245 (citing Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154).
Id.
No. 1:06-cv-451, 2008 WL 4822218 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2008).
Id. at *9 (quoting Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2153-54).
Id. at *10.
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B. Discretionin GovernmentalRegulation
In the months following Engquist, a federal district court extended the
discretionary exception to government regulation of health care facilities. In
Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel,2 18 the New York State Department of
Health refused to grant an operating permit to the plaintiff for the operation of its
clinical testing laboratory. 219 The plaintiff brought suit and alleged that the
defendants had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights under a class of one
theory because they had "intentionally and maliciously treated it differently from
other laboratories with no rational basis., 220 The court rejected that argument,
citing Engquist.221 The Kusel court noted that, while the court in Olech had
adopted a two-part test for a class of one claim-different treatment from
a
22
similarly situated entity and no rational basis for the different treatment
Engquist had added a third requirement "that the differential
treatment... resulted from non-discretionary state action." 223 In response to the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the plaintiff
had established genuine issues of material fact with regard to the two original
class of one requirements under Olech and that this ordinarily would preclude
the granting of a motion for summary judgment.224 The plaintiff, however, had
failed to meet the third requirement-nondiscretionary state action-which was
"fatal to its class of one claim."225 The plaintiff had complained of the State's
unwillingness to issue Certificates of Qualification and permits to operate the
226
laboratory.
The court explained, "These are clearly discretionary state
activities, as DOH [Department of Health] is entrusted with making licensing
decisions after subjectively reviewing each individual laboratory's qualifications,
the qualifications of its directors and potential directors, and any complaints and
investigation results regarding the laboratory." 227 The court concluded that the
plaintiff failed to allege a federal equal protection violation because the state
officials "possess[ed] discretion to subjectively evaluate laboratories and make
licensing decisions, and any differential
treatment of [the plaintiff] stemmed
228
from these discretionary activities."

218. No. 07 Civ. 3908 (BMC)(RER), 2008 WL 4222042 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008).
219. See id.at *3.

220. Id.
221. See id.
at *3-4 (citing Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2154).
222. Id.at *3 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Clubside, Inc.
v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.(citing Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154).
See id.
at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at *5.
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C. Discretionin Land Use Regulation
The discretion exception has also been extended to certain kinds of land use
regulation. In Nasca v. Town of Brookhaven,229 the plaintiff alleged that the
town's failure to grant him a rental permit, which was necessary to rent most
properties in the town, constituted a class of one violation. 230 The court granted
the town's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had not proved
that the properties not required to have permits were similarly situated to his
properties and because he had not proved that there was no rational basis for the
distinction. 231 As an alternative, the court noted:
Although the Engquist decision was applied in the public employment
context, the analysis by the Supreme Court suggests that "class of one"
challenges can only be made to non-discretionary decisions. Therefore,
to the extent plaintiff is challenging the discretionary decisions by the
Town as to the enforcement of its permit laws and code provisions,
Engquist suggests
that "class of one" challenges cannot be asserted as to
232
such decisions.
In Occhionero v. City of Fresno,233 the court considered a class of one
234
challenge to the city's pattern of enforcing its housing and fire codes.
The
court noted that it would heed "the warning of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Jennings and the U.S. Supreme Court's observation in Engquist as to
undermining discretion. ''235 The court determined that it was not "suited to judge
the reasonableness of the City's actions regarding
the property, 236 and granted
237
judgment.
summary
for
motion
the defendant's
Another line of constitutional cases that challenge land use decisions under
the doctrine of substantive due process has confirmed that a large degree of
discretion is the norm in land use cases. 238 In these cases, a plaintiff
must first
239
identify a property interest as the underlying basis of the claim.
In addition,
federal courts have developed a standard mode of analysis for these cases that

229. No. 05-CV-122 (JFB)(ETB), 2008 WL 4426906 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008).
230. Id. at *11.
231. Id. at *12.
232. Id. at *11 n.4.
233. No. CV F 05-1184 LJO SMS, 2008 WL 2690431 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2008).
234. Id. at *3-5.
235. Id. at *9 (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2154-55 (2008);
Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2004)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at *18.
238. See, e.g., MKA Realty Corp. v. Town of Wallkill, 82 F. App'x 712, 713 (2d Cir. 2003)
(housing development); Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 503 (2d Cir. 2001)
(special use permits); Merry Charters, L.L.C. v. Town of Stonington, 342 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73-77 (D.

Conn. 2004) (variance and special use permit).
239. HarlenAssocs., 273 F.3d at 503 (citing Crowley v. Courville, 76 F.3d 47, 52 (1996)).
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focuses on the level of discretion involved .240 For example, inHarlen Associates
v. IncorporatedVillage ofMineola,2 41 the plaintiff brought a suit under the equal
protection and due process clauses for the village's denial of a special use permit
to operate a convenience store. 242 The court rejected both claims. 243 As to the
substantive due process claim, the court held that, for the claimant to have a
property right, he must have a "'legitimate claim of entitlement."' 244 The
question of "'entitlement turns on whether the issuing authority lacks discretion
to deny the permit, i.e., is required to issue it upon ascertainment that certain
objectively ascertainable criteria have been met."' 245 The court went on to
conclude that the zoning law "vests considerable discretion in the Board with
respect to granting special use permits. 246 The determination of whether to grant
a permit is a multifaceted decision; the board is supposed to consider how
hazardous the proposed use is "by reason of excessive traffic, assembly of
persons or vehicles or roximity to travel routes or congregations of children,
pedestrians, or others.
Courts have also noted other "rational and permissible
bases for land use restrictions: noise, traffic, congestion, safety, aesthetics,
valuation of adjoining land, and effect on city services."24 8 It is clear that local
authorities exercise substantial discretion in land use cases, making them
inappropriate for class of one treatment after Engquist.
D. DiscretionaryJudgments in EducationalSettings
In the months after Engquist, lower courts determined that the Engquist
discretionary exception should extend to judgments made by educators in the
running of their schools. In Vassallo v. Lando,249 the principal of a high school
had searched a student's belongings based on the principal's suspicion that the
student had been involved in setting a fire at the school earlier in the day.250 The
student asserted a class of one claim in connection with the search. 251 The court
rejected it, citing Engquist:
As a threshold matter, this Court concludes that the Supreme Court's
recent decision in [Engquist] would foreclose a "class of one" claim by
plaintiff in connection with the discretionary decision by school

240.
241.
242.
243.

See, e.g., id.
at 503-04 (discussing discretion of zoning board).
273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id.at 497.
Id.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.at 504 (quoting Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Id.(quoting Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Id.
Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993).
591 F. Supp. 2d 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 178.
Id.
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administrators in this case as to whether a student should be interviewed
and searched for evidence of criminal activity.... [A]lthough Engquist
dealt with discretionary decisions in the public employment context, its
analysis and rationale clearly applies to discretionary determination by
decision-makers in other contexts, such as the one in the instant case.
The court explained further:
Decisions that defendants make on a day-to-day basis to ensure the
safety and welfare of the students under their care are necessarily
discretionary ones; they must have the leeway to single out certain
students for questioning when a disciplinary situation arises. Because
[the defendants] acted within their discretionary powers as Principal and
Superintendent when questioning and searching [the student], plaintiffs
"class of one" equal protection claim must fail.f 53
254

Similarly, the court in Bissessur v. Indiana University Board of Trustees
granted a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff made
a class of one challenge to his dismissal from a school of optometry. 255 The court
noted that the plaintiff had not adequately identified any similarly situated
persons. 256 More generally, the court determined:
The Supreme Court's rationale in Engquist effectively forecloses his
claim. In light of Plaintiffs failure to overcome the heightened pleading
requirements and the Supreme Court's recent limitation on the
availability of class of one claims in the context of discretionary
decision making, Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed for
failure to state an equal protection violation.
E. Discretionin Government Contracting

In Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc.,258 a highway paving contractor alleged
that it was wrongly singled out and treated differently from other paving
contractors in a government bidding process. 259 The court, applying Engquist,
rejected its class of one claim.260 The court explained that it had "little trouble

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.at 187 (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008)).
Id.at 189.
No. 1:07-CV-1290-SEb-WTL, 2008 WL 4274451 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 10, 2008).
Id.at * 1.
Id.at *8.
Id.at *9.
541 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1271.
Id.(citing Engquist v. Or.Dep't of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008)).
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applying the reasoning in Engquist, directed at... the government-employee
relationship, to the circumstances in this case involving a government-contractor
relationship."' 261 The court noted the similarities between government
employment and government contracts, mentioning the Supreme Court's view
that "'[t]he government needs to be free to terminate both employees and
contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and
responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of
corruption. ' ,, 262 Just as with government employment, "decisions involving
government contractors require broad discretion that may rest 'on a wide array of
factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify.' 263 The court then held that
Engquist was controlling and that the paving contractor had failed to assert a
cognizable right to equal protection. 264
V.

REVISITING THE PRE-ENGQUISTCASES THAT EMPHASIZE DISCRETION

When the Olech court created the class of one cause of action in 2000, it

gave no hint that there was any exception for government employment or
discretionary government actions. 265 In those pre-Engquist days, several federal
courts reached results consistent with Engquist by emphasizing the difficulty of
identifying similarly situated entities for purposes of comparison when a
government actor was exercising discretion. This part examines two of those
cases to demonstrate. how
.. widely the .Engquist
.266 exception might run.
In JicarillaApache Nation v. Rio Arriba County, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a class of one claim arising from a
challenge to a tax assessment of a property owned and used by the Jicarilla
Apache Nation as an upscale elk hunting resort.267 The case arose when the tax
assessor for Rio Arriba County changed the property's classification "from
agricultural to miscellaneous non-agricultural," increasing the tribe's property

tax bill by more than $110,000 per year.268 Because the assessor did not
reclassify other allegedly similar properties, the tribe argued that it was a class of
one that had been subjected to irrational and wholly arbitrary treatment. 269 The
assessor justified the differing treatment on the ground that it had received from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs a letter containing "unusually detailed information"
about the ranch and that the information, which was not available for other
ranches, provided a reason for the different treatment. 27 The court found that

261. Id.at 1274.

262. Id.(quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)).
263. Id.(quoting Engquist, 128 S.Ct.at 2154).

264. Id.
265. See Vill. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
266. 440 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2006).

267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.at 1204.
Id.
Id. (citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 564-65).
Id.at 1211.
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"[t]he [d]efendants' stated reason .

. . seem[ed] rational"
because the assessor
271
was "[u]sing information gained at little or no cost.
More importantly, the court identified another defect in the tribe's Olech
claim--"the lack of similarly situated comparators." 272 The court explained that
the test of similarity was very strict, requiring "similarity in all material
respects., 273 The court then explained the burden of proving similarity:

This already substantial burden will be especially difficult to satisfy in
the context of property tax assessment, where state actors must make
highly contextualjudgments about the worth of property. The difficulty
of comparing properties means that there may be material distinctions
between allegedly similarly situated parties, as well as a ready supply of
rational and not wholly arbitrary reasons for differential treatment.
This pre-Engquist court did not purport to base its decision on "discretion,"
but its focus on the "highly contextual judgments" about the worth of property
amounts to exactly the same thing-the exercise of discretion where a number of
variables are under consideration and the government decisionmaker must use
appropriate judgment in terms of giving appropriate weight to each of the
applicable variables.
In Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin,275 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit considered a class of one claim by the owner of a chicken
rendering plant who alleged that more stringent odor control restrictions had
been imposed on the plant than on any other chicken rendering plant in the
state.27 6 The plaintiffs allegations focused solely on its competitor, American
Proteins, as a similarly situated entity that had received more lenient
treatment.277 The court explained that the result in the case would turn on the
"degree of similarity [that] is required for two entities to be considered 'similarly
situated.' 278 To answer this question, the court explained:
In each case, however, the Court was able to analyze the "similarly
situated" requirement succinctly and at a high order of abstraction. This
was because the challenged governmental decisions were ultimately
one-dimensional-they involved a single answer to a single question. In
Olech, the only relevant factor was the size of the easement required in

271. Id.
272. Id. at 1212.

273. Id. The court also noted a Seventh Circuit case requiring that plaintiffs make a case "that
the compared properties are 'primafacie identical in all relevant respects."' Id. at 1213 (quoting
Purze v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2002)).
274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. 496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007).
276. Id. at 1195.
277. Id. at 1202-03.
278. Id. at 1203.
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return for connection to the municipal water supply. In Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal and Sioux City Bridge, the only relevant factor was the
market value of the property.
Here, by contrast, the government's regulatory action was
undeniably multi-dimensional, involving varied decisionmaking criteria
applied in a series of discretionary decisions made over an extended
period of time. In reviewing these decisions, we cannot use a simplistic,
post-hoc caricature of the decisionmaking process. Governmental
decisionmaking challenged under a "class of one" equal protection
theory must be evaluated in light of the full variety of factors that an
objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker would have found
relevant in making the challenged decision. Accordingly, when
dissimilar governmental treatment is not the product of a onedimensional decision-such as a standard easement or a tax assessed at
a pre-set percentage of market value-the "similarly situated"
requirement will be more difficult to establish.279
In analyzing the "similarly situated" prong of the Olech test, the court of
appeals emphasized that in all but the rare, one-dimensional, single issue
government decision, the class of one claim has no place.280 In the actual world
of governmental decisonmaking, where government officials must take into
account and weigh numerous factors, criteria, and considerations, the decision
will inevitably involve an exercise of discretion, and in such a situation, it will be
exceedingly difficult for a court to second-guess a government actor's decision
that two entities were different. This, of course, amounts to basically the same
rule that the Supreme Court adopted in Engquist.
In Griffin Industries, the Eleventh Circuit noted the possible differences
between Griffin and its competitor-the volume of rendering activity, the
number of citizen complaints, pressure from local politicians, and the selfreporting by its competitor of water pollution problems. 281 Because the State's
determination to regulate odors from Griffin's rendering plant was "the outcome
of complex, multi-factored government decisonmaking processes, '282 Griffin
had not stated an adequate class of one claim.283 At the time it was decided,
Griffin Industries suggested that it would be very difficult for a plaintiff to bring
a successful class of one claim challenging an environmental regulation or any
complex government regulation. Engquist confirms that difficulty.

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 1203-04 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.at 1206.
Id. at 1205.
Id.at 1210.
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VI. CONCLUSION: IS THERE ANYTHING LEFT TO THE CLASS OF ONE CLAIM

AFTER ENGQUIST?
The holding in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech was a mistake. The rationale
of Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture was a disappointment. Olech
established an equal protection cause of action without adequate precedent and,
in so doing, created the specter of local squabbles turning into constitutional
cases in federal courts. Engquist conceded that there was a problem with the
class of one claim but refused to address the conceptual problem head on or to
listen to the wisdom of the lower federal courts that imposed a bad faith
limitation on the class of one cause of action. Instead, the Engquist Court
purported to endorse the Olech cause of action but then created a vague and very
broad exception for discretionary governmental activity. This exception purports
to leave the holding of Olech in place, but in practice, it swallows up most of the
Olech holding and creates confusion for the lower federal courts.
When, in the future, the third class of one case reaches the Supreme Court,
the Court should be more faithful to its equal protection precedents. This means
recognizing that equal protection works best as a limit on government
classifications, not as a protector of individual rights. It also means that the Court
should endorse the one aspect of its class of one theory that makes sense and is
supported by pre-Olech precedents-the selective enforcement claim that
includes a bad motive element. All the rest should be jettisoned. Let the principle

prevail over its misapplication. 284

284. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 122 (1940) ("The real problem is whether a
principle shall prevail over its later misapplications.").
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